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RULE IOb-6: THE SPECIAL STUDY'S REDISCOVERED 
RULEt 
Jack M. Whitney II* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
THE Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in its recently released Report,1 pro-
vided an unprecedented critical analysis of issues and problem 
areas existing in the securities markets today. That analysis pro-
duced numerous recommendations for substantive changes in regu-
latory and self-regulatory laws, rules, and policies. One of the areas 
which, although discussed by the Special Study, was distinctive be-
cause not the subject of such a recommendation,2 was that involv-
ing the regulation of trading activities during a distribution.3 The 
t This article carries a date of authorship of November 1, 1963. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private 
publication by any of its members or employees. Therefore, the views expressed here 
are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or its 
staff. The author wishes to acknowledge the substantial contribution made by Mark K. 
Kessler, attorney in the Commission's Division of Corporation Finance, to the organization 
and content of this article, as well as the helpful comments and editorial assistance of 
Richard H. Brill, the author's legal assistant. 
• Member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 1961; Member of the Illinois 
Bar.-Ed. 
1 Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special Study]. 
In the interest of brevity, this article assumes some degree of familiarity on the part 
of the reader with the pertinent characteristics of over-the-counter ("OTC") trading mar-
kets. The requisite background material may be found principally in Chapters IV, VII 
and VIII of parts 1 and 2 of the Special Study. 
2 It is noted, however, that certain affirmative recommendations are set forth which 
would flow from a Commission clarification of the applicability of Rule IOb-6. See note 
57 infra; Special Study pt. I, at 568-70. 
3 The term "distribution" is used in this article almost exclusively in the context 
of Rule lOb-6 and of the Exchange Act anti-manipulative provisions generally. It is 
not necessary (nor even necessarily easy) to reconcile completely the substantive content 
of the term, as so used, with that of the same term as used in the context of the 
Securities Act of 1933. (See note 23 infra.) In Rule lOb-6, the term "distribution" is em-
ployed to fix the setting in which, for the protection of investors, restrictions must be im-
posed upon the actors in that setting, in order to prevent distortion of the market price 
and trading activity of the securities involved. In the 1933 Act (e.g., in § 2(11) and Rules 
133 and 154, thereunder), on the other hand, the term is used to facilitate a determination 
of whether circumstances exist such as to require the registration of securities in order 
to provide fair and adequate disclosure of factual and financial information on which 
an intelligent investment decision may be based. This accounts for the common as-
sumption that the term, as used in the 1933 Act, is substantially synonymous with the 
term "public offering" which appears in § 4(1) of that act. Such, indeed, is the import 
of the House Report's statement, with respect to the 1933 act, that ". • • the Act is, 
in the main, concerned with the problem of distribution as distinguished from trading." 
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933). In any event, the prudent "rule of 
thumb" assumes that a registered 1933 Act "distribution" normally will be subject to 
Rule lOb-6 but that an exemption from 1933 Act registration is not determinative of 
the inapplicability of the rule. See discussion in text at Part II(B)(2) infra. 
[ 567] 
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Special Study concluded that the Commission's principal rule in 
this area, Rule lOb-64 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,5 
was subject to widespread misunderstanding or uncertainty in the 
industry and urged the Commission to take appropriate steps to 
clarify the application of the rule in various enumerated situations.6 
The rule, together with its siblings, Rules l0b-7 and l0b-8,7 
was adopted on July 5, 1955.8 The body of the rule prohibits an 
underwriter, prospective underwriter, or other participant in a 
distribution, or any person on whose behalf such distribution is 
being made, from directly or indirectly bidding for or purchasing 
the securities being distributed or any other securities of the same 
class and series, or any right to purchase any such security, or from 
attempting to induce anyone else to bid for or purchase such 
securities, prior to or during a distribution. This is followed by 
eleven exceptions and several exemptive provisions as well as def-
initions for certain of the rule's more critical terms.9 Thus, the rule 
takes the form of a sweeping prohibition from which are carved 
certain categories of activities and transactions which are necessary 
adjuncts of the mechanics of distribution and either do not con-
tain manipulative potential, or are insulated sufficiently to render 
the manipulative potential de minimis. It is the exceptions and 
the exemptions which give the rule viability and feasibility.10 
Rule 1 0b-6 evolved from a history of regulation of practices 
designed to maintain artificially the market price of a security in 
preparation for or during a distribution of that security to the 
public. Congress, in 1934, was concerned about such practices as 
speculative pooling operations, "wash sales," and "matched or-
ders," all of which, if employed effectively, served to exploit the 
public by permitting dispositions of securities at artificial 
prices.11 These practices, of course, were to be distinguished from 
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-6 (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
5 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958 8e Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Exchange 
Act]. 
6 See text accompanying note 30 infra. 
7 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.IOb-7, .IOb-8 (Cum. Supp. 1963). These rules deal, respectively, with 
stabilizing activities during a distribution and offerings of securities by means of rights. 
Although the general provisions of Rule IOb-6 would prohibit certain of these activities, 
the rule, in exceptions (8) and (9), specifically permits activities carried out in accord-
ance with Rules IOb-7 and IOb-8. See 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1596 (2d ed. 1961). 
s SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5194, July 5, 1955, amended, SEC Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 5208, August 15, 1955. 
11 See Appendix. 
10 For a thorough discussion of the genesis and language of the rule, see 3 Loss, op. 
cit. supra note 7, at 1595-1604; Foshay, Market Activities of Participants in Securities 
Distributions, 45 VA. L. REv. 907 (1959). 
11 Staff of Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Report Relative to Stock Ex-
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the commonly accepted "distribution pool or syndicate,''12 which 
performed a stabilizing function such as we know today. Section 
9 of the Exchange Act18 emerged from this atmosphere as the 
statutory prohibition against manipulation of prices of securi-
ties listed on a national securities exchange. Paragraph (a)(2) of 
that section was intended to curb most of the evils described 
above, while the regulation of stabilization practices was left to the 
Commission through the exercise of the rule-making power dele-
gated to it by paragraph (a)(6). Section IO(b),14' which generally 
makes it unlawful to employ any manipulative or deceptive device 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any listed or unlisted 
security, is not self-executing and, with the exceptions of one abor-
tive Commission attempt to legislate in this area15 and Rule I0b-2 
with respect to distributions on a national securities exchange, 16 
no rule comparable to Rule I 0b-6 was adopted thereunder until 
1955. The heart of that portion of the Exchange Act dedicated to 
the OTC market, however, appeared in the broad and general 
terms of the original section 15,17 which was a sweeping delegation 
of regulatory powers to the Commission in this area. 
All of this merely reflects the separate and different treatment 
which Congress in 1934 accorded to the exchange markets and 
the OTC market. While the statute was self-executing and reason-
ably specific with respect to the former, it was broad and dele-
gatory in the latter in recognition of the then unexplored charac-
ter of the OTC market.18 
change Regulation, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-15 (Comm. Print 1934); see also S. REP. 
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-10 (1934). 
12 Report Relative to Stock Exchange Regulation, supra note 11, at 13. 
18 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1958). 
H 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958). 
15 The Commission, in Barrett &: Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 329-31 (1941), repealed Rule 
X-l0B-4, a rule which had been intended to carry over the prohibitions of § 9(a) 
of the Exchange Act to the OTC market but which never became effective. See also 
text accompanying note 21 infra •• 
16 Since Rule IOb-2 [17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-2 (Cum. Supp. 1963)] involves distributions 
using the facilities of an exchange, the subsequent adoption of Rule IOb-6 makes it plain 
that the latter is directed primarily at problems arising from distributions in the OTC 
market. For a discussion of Rule IOb-2, see 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1236-39, 
1427 n.19. See also note 74 infra. 
17 48 Stat. 892 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1958); see note 18 infra. 
18 Special Study pt. 4, at 604. In the Tenth Annual Report of Securities and Ex-
change Commission, the Commission stated: 
"In contrast to other areas in which the Commission commenced its administrative 
duties in June 19!14, there were little or no reliable data concerning the scope or nature 
of the abuses to which the directives of Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 were intended to apply ..•• [A)s to over-the-counter markets, the legislative his-
tory of the Securities Exchange Act yields little information and sheds little light on 
the directives of Section 15 relating to over-the-counter regulation, beyond the obvious 
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- Pursuant to statutory amendments in 1936 and 1938, section 
15(c) emerged as the general anti-manipulative section of the 
Exchange Act concerning the OTC market.19 The Report states: 
"Working first with this broad grant of power [the original 
section 15] and, a few years later, with an amended statute, 
the Commission provided for registration of broker-dealers 
engaging in over-the-counter transactions, the prohibition of 
various fraudulent practices, and the adoption of standards 
for recordkeeping and financial responsibility. [Footnote omit-
ted.] With the passage of the Maloney Act in 1938 [52 Stat. 
1070, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1938)], the principle of self-regula-
tion was applied to the over-the-counter markets, and the 
NASD [National Association of Securites Dealers, Inc.] was 
formed to supervise the business conduct of over-the-counter 
broker-dealers. [Footnote omitted.]"20 
The Commission, in 1941, held that the prohibitions of section 
15(c)(l) of the Exchange Act afford "to the over-the-counter mar-
ket at least as great a degree of protection against manipulation or 
attempted control as is afforded to the exchange market by Section 
9(a)."21 And, as is further indicated below,22 prior to 1955, those 
cases involving situations which presently fall within the prohibi-
tions of Rule I0b-6 were decided on the basis of the aforemen-
tioned sections and the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act 
of 193323 and the Exchange Act. 
It is important also to note that Rules IOb-6, I0b-7, and IOb-8 
did not emerge from an atmosphere of practices calling for urgent 
promulgation of corrective measures. Rather, they were the result 
of years of Commission and industry experience with the anti-
manipulative sections of the Exchange Act,24 and the fraud pro-
facts that unique opportunities for abuse existed in that market and that regulation of 
exchange markets made necessary the regulation of counter markets, since business tends 
to flow from regulated to unregulated areas." 10 SEC ANN. REP. 69 (1944). 
19 For a discussion of the evolution of § 15 of the Exchange Act, see Tenth Annual 
Report of Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 18, at 68-72. 
20 Special Study pt. 2, at 541. 
21 Barrett &: Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 328 (1941). 
22 See note 24 infra. 
23 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Securities 
Act]. The basic anti-fraud provisions of this act are contained in § 17 (15 U.S.C. § 77q) 
thereof. 
24 Prior to 1955, the Commission, in situations which now would fall within Rule 
l0b-6, relied on such general anti-manipulative sections of the Exchange Act as § 9(a)(2), 
with respect to listed securities, § 15(c)(l), with respect to unlisted securities, and on 
anti-fraud provisions of both the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. Adams&: Co., 33 S.E.C. 
444 (1952); Halsey, Stuart &: Co., 30 S.E.C. 106 (1949); Barrett &: Co., 9 S.E.C. 319 (1941); 
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visions of both the 1933 Act and the Exchange Act. They were, in 
large part, a codification and synthesis arrived at only after many 
months of consultation with industry representatives. Through 
this process, "the differences between the Commission's staff and 
industry were greatly reduced."25 Whatever reservations might 
then have persisted in anyone else's mind, the Commission's con-
clusion was succinct: 
"The Commission believes that these rules, which repre-
sent a formulation of principles which have been generally 
followed, will not impede the orderly distribution of securi-
ties and will afford investors protection against manipulative 
and deceptive devices in situations in which the rules are 
applicable."26 
The Commission further stated in the public release announcing 
the adoption of the above rules: 
"The Rules adopted do not purport to cover every possi-
ble type of manipulative or deceptive activity. The fact that 
a particular activity is not specifically dealt with or prohibited 
in such rules does not necessarily mean that it is not unlawful 
under the Act or the Commission's other rules."27 
There is nothing to indicate that the Commission's position is 
different today. The codification of administrative policy which 
has been formulated on an ad hoc basis inevitably entails some 
measure of change from prior administrative practice.28 Neverthe-
less, comparison of Commission and federal court opinions arising 
before and after adoption of the rule demonstrates that it was in 
fact "a formulation of principles which have been generally fol-
lowed."20 Likewise, the Commission, in its informal administrative 
S, T. Jackson &: Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4459 at 30, n. 51, June 23, 1950; SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3505, Nov. 16, 1943; SEC Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 3056, Oct. 27, 1941; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 605, April 17, 1936. 
See generally, Foshay, supra note 10, at 910-13, and cases cited therein. The Commission, 
since passage of the rule, continues to consider such situations in light of other anti-
manipulative provisions of the Exchange Act and the rules thereunder. See, e.g., Landau 
Co., 40 S.E.C. 1119 (1962) (§ 15(c) and Rules 15cl-2, 15cl-8); C. A. Benson &: Co., SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7044, March 26, 1963 (§ 15(c)(l) and Rule 15cl-2). 
25 Foshay, supra note IO, at 919. Such is indeed the typical result of the informal 
and formal processes observed by the Commission in the exercise of its rule-making 
powers. 
26 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5194 at 3, July 5, 1955. (Emphasis added.) 
21 Ibid. 
28 See generally 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 7. 
20 Compare Koeppe v. SEC, 95 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1938), and Kidder Peabody &: Co., 18 
S.E.C. 559 (1945), and Russell Maguire &: Co., IO S.E.C. 332 (1941), and Barrett &: Co., 9 
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interpretations since 1955, has attempted to apply principles con-
sistent with those employed prior to the passage of the rule. If the 
Commission or the industry were of the view in 1954 and early 
1955, while the proposed rule was being discussed among all par-
ties expressing interest, that there was a substantial awareness and 
understanding of the "situations in which the rules are applica-
ble," the basis for the Special Study's concern can only be the con-
clusion that such a view is not now tenable. To the extent the bro-
ker-dealer community, which must live under and with the rule-
sweeping prohibition and all-is confused or ill-informed, the rule 
has not served its intended functions in that the protections for the 
interest of investors, so painstakingly developed, are not achieved, 
and the goal of reasonable certitude in the "rules of the game" is 
not within reach of the players. 
An attempt either to assign responsibility for the breakdown 
in communication or to secure a quantitative measure of the con-
sequences of that breakdown would be bootless. I attempt here 
only to pinpoint some of the areas of seeming ambiguity within 
the rule, and to consider them in light of a variety of situations 
wherein, it is hoped, the problems will become clearer and more 
precise, thus facilitating the consideration of whether solutions 
are needed and what form they should take. 
II. PROBLEMS CONCERNING APPLICABILITY OF THE RULE 
The Report identifies four situations where it has found in-
dustry "misunderstandings and uncertainties" with respect to the 
application of Rule I0b-6: "(a) during a period when stock is 
being held 'for investment' by a broker-dealer, (b) in connection 
with various forms of 'shelf' registration, ( c) in connection with a 
planned reduction of inventory or 'workout,' and (d) in connec-
tion with unregistered distributions generally."30 
Pivotal to any question of the applicability of the rule is the 
question of whether a particular person is either a participa:µt in 
or the beneficiary of a "distribution." This question, in turn, must 
be considered in the context of the variety of situations listed 
S.E.C. 319 (1941), and SEC v. Sapbier, 1 SEC Jud. Dec. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), with SEC v. 
Electronics Security Corp., 217 F. Supp. 831 (D. Minn. 1963), and SEC v. Scott Taylor, 183 
F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), and Landau Co., 40 S.E.C. 1119 (1962), and Bruns, Nordeman 
&: Co., 40 S.E.C. 652 (1961), and Gob Shops of Am., 39 S.E.C. 92 (1959), and Sutro Bros., 
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7053, April 10, 1963; C. A. Benson &: Co., SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7044, March 26, 1963. 
so special Study pt. 1, at 559. 
1964] RULE I0b-6 573 
above, i.e., those which involve a registered offering pursuant to 
the 1933 Act as well as those which do not. 
A. Situations Involving Registered Distributions 
There is no question that a "distribution" is contemplated in 
an underwritten offering to the public of previously unregistered 
securities pursuant to registration under the 1933 Act, or that 
there are persons "participating" or about to "participate" in that 
"distribution." There may be some misunderstanding, however, 
as to why this is so. Some persons, recognized by the rule and ad-
ministrative practice as being engaged in a distribution, notwith-
standing the existence of an exemption from registration under 
the 1933 Act for the securities which are the subject of that dis-
tribution, conduct their business as though such exempt status 
were a conclusive indication that a distribution is not involved for 
Rule IOb-6 purposes.81 This.position has been rejected by both the 
courts and the Commission, which have made it clear that 1933 
Act interpretations or implications are not determinative of what 
constitutes a distribution under Rule I0b-6.32 It is enough at this 
point to conclude that use of the obvious example for illustrative 
purposes should not convey any notion of exclusivity. 
I. Stock Acquired by an Underwriter in Connection With 
a Distribution 
It is the policy of the Commission to require that securities 
acquired by underwriters in connection with a public offering of 
securities must be included in the registration statement covering 
the offering, notwithstanding the underwriter's avowal of an in-
tention to acquire the securities for investment.33 Subsequently, 
should the underwriter decide to dispose of such stock in the mar-
Sl See id. at 568 & n.216. 
32 "It is enough if the broker or dealer is engaged in a distribution in the sense of 
a major selling effort in his own behalf." Gob Shops of Am., 39 S.E.C. 92, 103 n.25 
(1959), cited favorably in SEC v. Scott Taylor, 183 F. Supp. 907, 908 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
In Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 660 (1961), the Commission said that "rule 
IOb-6 is applicable to all distributions whether or not subject to registration under the 
Securities Act and whether or not the conventional procedure of utilizing an underwriter 
or selling group is employed. [Citing SEC v. Scott Taylor.] The term 'distribution' as 
used in Rule l0b-6 is to be interpreted in the light of the rule's purposes as covering 
offerings of such a nature or magnitude as to require restrictions upon open market 
purchases by participants in order to prevent manipulative practices. [Footnote omitted.] 
For these purposes a distribution is to be distinguished from ordinary trading transac-
tions and other normal conduct of a securities business upon the basis of the magnitude 
of the offering and particularly upon the basis of the selling efforts and selling methods 
utilized." 
ss SEC Securities Act Release No. 3210, April 9, 1947. 
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ket, a post-effective amendment disclosing the terms of the offering 
is required.34 Assuming that the original distribution has been suc-
cessfully completed pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (c)(3)-
(B)35 of the rule, the question arises as to the permissible scope of 
activities in which the underwriter may engage during the interim 
period between completion of the original offering and the ulti-
mate disposition of its stock.36 There are two principal questions 
with which the underwriter must contend during this period:87 
First, may it buy and sell as principal for its own account and, 
second, may it solicit agency transactions in the usual conduct of 
its retail activities.38 
The rule provides a clear answer to the first question. In the 
case of buying as principal, exception (11) permits the underwriter, 
during the interim period, to conduct normal trading activ-
ities in the OTC market as principal up to and including the tenth 
business day prior to the proposed date of distribution, at which 
time it must terminate purchasing or bidding for any security of 
the same class. It may make unsolicited principal purchases, how-
ever, up to and including five business days preceding the distribu-
tion.39 It should be noted that exception (11) does not restrict the 
permitted purchases and bids to the "inside" dealer market. In the 
case of selling as principal, exception (6) permits the underwriter 
to solicit retail purchase orders to be effected on a principal basis 
from inventory or, in the rare case, by incurring a short position.80a 
To place sole reliance upon this exception, however, is to as-
sume that the prohibition of the rule has been appropriately 
invoked in the first place. In seeking the answer to the second 
question, the validity of the assumption must be faced squarely, 
since it must be determined whether the rule's prohibition 
34 It has been the practice of the Commission staff to require an undertaking that 
prior to any offering of such stock occurring after ninety days following the effective date 
of the registration statement, a post-effective amendment will be filed disclosing such 
current information as would be required in a new registration statement. 
35 See Appendix. 
36 The Study found that managing underwriters receiving stock or options in con-
nection with the underwriting or in interim financing generally did not dispose of such 
holdings during or shortly after the original offering, perhaps because of tax considera-
tions. Special Study pt. 1, at 508, 541. 
37 This discussion assumes (realistically, I believe) that the disposition of the stock 
will take the form of a public offering constituting a "distribution" under Rule lOb-6. 
See note 32 supra. 
38 Administrative practice construes solicitations of agency transactions to include 
any solicitations, by way of market letter or otherwise, not directly related to sales by 
a dealer for its own account. 
39 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-6, exception (11) (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
39a 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-6, exception (6) (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
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against the solicitation of purchases on an agency basis comes into 
play. A matter of time is at once involved; if the underwriter has 
no intention of holding his stock for investment there is no prob-
lem, since the original offering and the disposition of the stock are 
merged in time and in fact, as well as conceptually. Consequently, 
no basis exists for asserting that more than one distribution is in-
volved. Where, however, the underwriter has an express, bona 
fide intention to "shelve" his stock, a basis for argument arises. 
Underwriters claim that the requirement that such stock be reg-
istered along with the principal offering is based upon considera-
tions arising out of the 1933 Act which are not necessarily relevant 
in the resolution of questions arising under Rule I0b-6. Accord-
ingly, they argue that the rule contemplates two distributions and 
that solicitation of agency purchases should not be prohibited 
during the interim period until there is a manifest intention to 
dispose of such stock. They argue, further, that in those situations 
in which they intend to make a market for the stock, especially 
where the underwriter intends to hold his stock for long-term 
investment, it is unrealistic to differentiate between principal and 
agency transactions, so far as "solicitation" is concerned. Paren-
thetically, it goes without saying that market-making is dependent 
upon the existence somewhere of retail activity, which, in turn, 
involves some measure of merchandising or retail selling.4° Finally, 
they assert that any manipulative practice would be curbed by the 
other anti-manipulative provisions of the Exchange Act, and the 
rules and regulations thereunder.41 
The Special Study refers to a situation in which an underwriter, 
whose partners in advance had acquired investment stock in con-
nection with an underwriting, was informed by the Commission 
that, during the interim period between the completion of the 
principal offering and the distribution of their stock, the firm 
could not engage in activities involving the solicitation of agency 
transactions but that it could engage in trading activities for its 
principal account to the extent permitted by exception (11). The 
Special Study's analysis is that the basis for this result was that 
-iO As to non-integrated firms the Report states: "There are several possible motives 
for making a market. Probably of greatest significance, particularly for nonintegrated 
firms, is the desire of the dealer simply to profit from expected activity of broker-dealers 
engaged in executing buy or sell orders for public customers . . . . A trader for such 
a wholesale dealer expects activity to come from retail houses; when that activity falls off, 
he may lose interest and discontinue trading." Special Study pt. 2, at 563. The same 
basic considerations obtain, perhaps to a lesser degree, in the integrated firm . 
.fl For a discussion on how some firms actually do conduct operations during the 
investment period, especially as to soliciting agency purchases, see id. pt. I, at 542-44. 
576 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
there were in fact two separate distributions involved,42 but that 
the second was contemplated from the time of the original offering. 
It would appear to follow that the basis for the Commission's posi-
tion was that the underwriter was also a "prospective underwriter" 
(as defined in paragraph (c)(2) of the rule), despite his assertion of 
investment intent, with respect to the subsequent disposition of his 
own stock,48 and that he was' to be considered as such from the time 
of the original offering. That basis, in turn, would appear to be de-
pendent upon the usual prospectus disclosure that the underwriter 
in the original offering may be deemed to be an underwriter, for 
1933 Act purposes, in the distribution of his own stock. 
Ordinarily, where two distributions occur separately in time, 
Rule 1 0b-6 is considered as applying to each independently of the 
other, and the rule is not invoked as to the second distribution 
until the intention to effectuate it is manifest. If the result is 
different in the situation involving registration of an underwri-
ter's stock, i.e., the dispositive intention is assumed to exist at the 
time of the original offering rather th.,m being dependent on a 
later expression of a change of intention on the part of the under-
writer, there can be little question but that registration under the 
1933 Act and the representations required in connection therewith 
tend to deprecate the underwriter's expressed intention to hold his 
stock for investment. 
Setting aside any question concerning the merits of applying 
1933 Act interpretations to a rule under the Exchange Act, the 
Special Study's analysis does not have smooth sailing within the rule 
itself. Paragraph (c)(3) of the rule defines the bases for determining 
when a person under the rule may be deemed to have completed 
his participation in a particular distribution. An underwriter, for 
example, completes his participation and is released from the rule's 
42 A contrary assumption, i.e., that the result was based on the belief that the entire 
sequence of events, including both the principal offering and the disposition of the 
underwriter's stock, constituted one offering, is untenable in light of the fact that the 
Commission, by permitting trading to resume in the interim period subject to excep-
tion (11) of the rule, implicitly recognized the existence of two distributions. 
48 Special Study pt. I, at 545. The rule, on the surface, offers some resistance 
to this interpretation. For purposes of Rule IOb-6, it would be difficult to label the 
holder of stock acquired in connection with underwriting activities as an "underwriter" 
or "prospective underwriter" with respect to the distribution of such stock after it had 
been held for a substantial period and where other pertinent circumstances are consist-
ent with an intention to hold for investment. Thus, if he is considered to be an "issuer,'' 
"other person on whose behalf such a distribution is being made," "broker," "dealer,'' 
or "other person" pursuant to Rule 10b-6(a)(2) and (3), the rule does not apply to 
such persons until the actual distribution is commenced. Administrative practice, how-
ever, has been that the rule may be applicable to an issuer or the vendor about to 
distribute securities. See Foshay, supra note 10, at 920-21. 
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application "when he has distributed his participation, and any 
stabilization arrangements and trading restrictions with respect to 
such distribution to which he is a party have been terminated." 
The last sentence of paragraph (c)(3) states, "A person, including 
an underwriter or dealer, shall be deemed for purposes of this 
paragraph (c)(3) to have distributed securities acquired by him for 
investment." The rule, therefore, contemplates the possibility that 
two distributions may occur even in the underwriter's stock situa-
tion and pays no heed to whether such stock has been registered un-
der the 1933 Act. To the extent that the last sentence of paragraph 
(c)(3) fixes only the point in time when the primary offering is 
completed (indeed, this was the only purpose for including in the 
rule the language just quoted), and does not refer to the point in 
time when the rule begins to apply to the subsequent distribution 
of the retained block of stock, there is no conflict with the Study's 
analysis. The two positions, however, are anchored to opposite 
poles of departure in that the rule, on its face, reflects an intention 
to consider the two dispositions of stock as separate distributions, 
whereas the alleged Commission reasoning, which would hold that 
the firm is a "prospective underwriter" of the stock which they 
purport to take for investment, rests on 1933 Act considerations 
which tend to bridge the separation of the two distributions. Of 
course, as is discussed below,44 even though the "two separate 
distributions" analysis might take an underwriter out from under 
the rule, it would not give him a carte blanche to engage in manip-
ulative activity intended to benefit a disposition of his stock at 
some indefinite future time. 
The ultimate effect of the analysis set forth by the Special Study 
is that the underwriter is prohibited from soliciting agency pur-
chases throughout the period of time spanning the two distribu-
tions but that exception (11) is available for each distribution so 
as to permit principal transactions. This result, as suggested above, 
does not comply with a literal reading of the rule, and may result 
in inequitable treatment. 
In light of the proviso to exception (11)-"[I]f none of such 
purchases or bids are for the purpose of creating actual, or appar-
ent, active trading in or raising the price of such security"-
it has been the administrative practice, in cases where trading 
activity appears to have been excessive, to extend the ten-day pro-
hibition of the exception in order to provide a "cooling-off" period 
prior to the distribution. Such a procedure, of necessity, would 
44 See text accompanying notes 60, 61 infra. 
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invoke the rule as of the date such action is taken and would thus 
prohibit the solicitation of agency purchases for a period sufficient 
to insulate the market from the possible manipulative effect of 
such solicitation. 45 Since the Commission would be informed as to 
the intended date of distribution by the filing of a post-effective 
amendment,46 these precautions could be taken and the rule's pur-
poses enforced without resorting to the more harsh strictures of 
the position taken by the Commission in the instance cited by the 
Special Study. 
2. The "Sticky" Issue 
Where an underwriter in a firm commitment offering fails to 
distribute to the public the entire amount of shares being offered, it 
may choose to "eat" the unsold shares by placing them on the "shelf" 
for investment, terminating stabilization and trading restrictions, 
and then commencing trading in the security in reliance upon 
paragraph (c)(3) of the rule. Under these circumstances the Com-
mission's administrative practice contemplates resumption of trad-
ing activities subject to the obvious further proviso that the unsold 
shares not be fed to the public through such trading operations.47 
Any activities conducted during the interim period which con-
stitute solicitation of agency transactions would most likely be 
considered as being in violation of Rule l0b-6, since the same 
basic considerations apply in this situation as in the underwriter's 
stock situation cited above, with the exception that in the former 
instance the underwriter is more or less forced into taking an 
investment position with respect to the "shelved" stock, whereas 
in the latter it is presumed that the underwriter had entertained, 
ab initio, a bona fide investment intent as to the stock acquired by 
him. Although the circumstances might tend to cast doubt on the 
bona fides of the investment intent in connection with "shelving" 
a sticky issue, and thus provide greater support for the application 
of the rule than in the case involving underwriter's stock, this 
interpretation nevertheless is subject to the very same legal and 
practical difficulties. 
3. Interim Financing 
It is not unusual for investment banking firms to provide risk 
capital to companies well in advance of a public offering. Although 
an underwritten public offering for permanent financing may be 
something more than a gleam in the banker's eye, the shares are 
45 See text accompanying note 26 supra. 
46 See note 34 supra. 
47 See Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106 (1949). 
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placed in long-term investment accounts of principals (and their 
associates) in the firm or in such an account of the firm itself.48 
Frequently, these shares are not registered when the time arrives 
for the issuer to make a public offering on the ground that such 
securities do not constitute stock acquired by the underwriter in 
connection with the public offering.49 The Special Study found 
that these underwriters did not tend to distribute their investment 
position in the issuer during the period immediately following the 
completion of the public offering.50 
The obvious question, as far as Rule 1 0b-6 is concerned, is 
when the rule initially applies to the underwriter with respect 
to the unregistered investment stock obtained through interim 
financing. In those cases where no registration is required, the 
interim financing situation is distinguishable from the underwri-
ter's stock situation for Rule l0b-6 purposes, in that there would 
be no basis for applying the rule in the former instance until an 
intention to distribute the investment stock is manifest. Thus, 
there would be no prohibition against the solicitation of agency 
purchases until an intention to distribute the investment stock is 
manifested by the registration of those shares, if required by 1933 
Act concepts, or by an affirmative expression of such intention. If 
this result suggests some degree of inconsistency with the result in 
the underwriter's stock situation where, despite the registration of 
that stock, the underwriter's investment intention may be as bona 
fide as it is with respect to his interim financing holding, the an-
swer, from the industry's point of view, may be simply that half a 
loaf is better than none. 
In any event, if the benefits of the dichotomy are to be secured, 
the transaction providing the interim financing must exhibit the 
indicia of investment intent. An interim investment arrangement 
where absence of risk is evident may well be questioned. 
B. Situations Involving Unregistered Distributions 
I. The Nature of the Problem 
A thornier problem arises when a broker-dealer accumulates a 
position in a particular security, as a market-maker or otherwise, 
48 The Spedal Study suggests that tax considerations play a significant part in this 
procedure. "[I]t can be said that it is generally to the advantage of an -underwriter to 
establish that any stock or options received from issuers do not constitute compensation 
for risks assumed or services performed as underwriters, but rather are an investment 
undertaken by the firm or its principals, unconnected with its underwriting business" 
Special Study pt. I, at 508. 
49 Id. at 542. 
150 Id. at 541. 
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and plans to dispose of such stock at some time in the near future, 
or when a dealer participates in a block sale or in a selling program 
on behalf of an institutional investor. Assuming the stock is "free 
stock" for 1933 Act purposes, there, nevertheless, may be a distri-
bution involved for Rule I 0b-6 purposes in the disposition of the 
stock.51 
With respect to the inventory workout situation the Report 
states: 
"Interviews with trading firms in the course of the study 
of the over-the-counter markets disclosed that firms frequently 
sold large inventory positions by means of selling effort and 
at the same time continued to maintain a trading market for 
the issues involved. One such firm indicated to the study that 
it had never even considered the possibility of Rule I 0b-6 
applying to such a situation."52 
On the subject of block sales, including sales on behalf of institu-
tional investors, the Report states: 
"In the absence of a formal underwriting agreement, how-
ever, many firms appear to regard the disposition of a block, 
no matter how large, as subject to no greater controls than 
normal trading transactions despite the fact that the dis-
position may have all the characteristics of a 'distribution.' "158 
Notwithstanding the fact that many inventory workout pro-
grams and block sales involve stock positions of the magnitude of 
distributions which are registered pursuant to the 1933 Act,H and 
the fact that both the courts and the Commission have interpreted 
the word in general terms,155 an industry version of what constitutes 
a distribution for purposes of Rule I 0b-6 is provided in the re-
sponse of a large member firm of the New York Stock Exchange to 
a Special Study inquiry: 
" '[A] point which in our view needs clarification under 
(rule I0b-6) is the meaning of the term "distribution" as used 
in the rule. We believe that most members of the investment 
151 Most of these distributions requiring a strong selling effort, even those involving 
listed stocks, are effected in the over-the-counter market, where regulatory controls by 
the exchange over the distribution do not apply. Id. at 560-64. See also note 74 infra. 
152 Spedal Study pt. I, at 546-47. The Study then refers to one firm whose practice 
it is to withdraw completely from the market and terminate all advisory activities and 
the solicitation of agency purchases six months prior to its disposition of stock acquired 
in connection with an -underwriting, but to disregard such policy with respect to dispo-
sitions of stock positions acquired in the market. Ibid. 
158 Id. pt. 2, at 591. 
154 Id. pt. I, at 559-60. 
155 See note 32 supra. 
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community construe this term to mean an offering registered 
under the Securities Act of 1933 or an "unregistered second-
ary," i.e., an offering which because of its size must be syndi-
cated by the dealer handling it or handled in some other way 
as an organized distribution. We believe that it would be 
helpful if the SEC were to announce a definition of the term 
so that a dealer would know for certain when the restrictions 
of the rule are to be applied. To be helpful, the definition 
should be precise as to the size of the offering, number of 
shares, etc., and not phrased in general terms.' " 156 
The quoted firm would appear to have had in mind a "rule of 
thumb" definition such as the Commission gave to the term "dis-
tribution" in Rule 154157 under the 1933 Act. Of course, it must be 
borne in mind that one of the circumstances that permitted such 
certainty in Rule 154 was that other provisions of that rule effec-
tively prevent manipulative activity in connection with the sales 
permitted by the rule. It would be surprising if the industry would, 
as the price of certainty of application of Rule IOb-6, agree that 
the latter rule should take on the "strait jacket" characteristics of 
Rule 154. 
A further limitation, however, on the benefits to flow from a 
response to the particular industry plea quoted above arises from 
two related assumptions implicit in it: first, that a more specific 
definition of the term "distribution" will provide the certainty 
needed for comprehension of and compliance with the rule, and 
second (erroneously), that the rule does, and was intended by its 
framers to, contain all of the anti-manipulative regulation of trad-
ing activities at or near the time of a disposition of securities by 
persons interested or participating in such disposition, to the ex-
clusion of any other applicable section of the securities laws or of 
the rules and regulations thereunder. Indeed, sections IO(b) and 
9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act, on which this anti-manipulative rule 
is based, 158 can reach any "purchase or sale" rather than only the 
ISO special Study pt. 1, at 568. 
IS7 "[T]he term 'distribution' shall not be deemed to include a sale or series of sales 
of securities which, together with all other sales of securities of the same class by or on 
behalf of the same person within the preceding period of six months, will not exceed 
[in the case of an OTC security] ••• approximately one percent of the shares or units 
of such security outstanding •••• " 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
For purposes of one of its recommendations, the Special Study defined "unregistered 
distribution" "to include the sale by any broker-dealer, as principal (including any 
planned reduction of inventory or 'workout') or as agent, of any block of securities of 
such size as to require an underwriting or selling group and/or receipt or payment of 
compensation exceeding normal compensation for routine (nonblock) transactions in 
similar securities, unless the block is sold to fewer than 25 purchasers and/or at an 
aggregate price of (say) $300,000 or less." Special Study pt. I, at 570. 
158 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5194 at !l, July, 5, 1955. 
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situation involving a distribution. Prior to the adoption of Rule 
1 0b-6, trading activities which the industry may believe to be out-
side the scope of the rule were being considered and even pro-
hibited on the basis of other sections of the Exchange Act and the 
1933 Act.59 As Professor Loss states, "[E]xcept to the extent that 
the doctrine was refined with the adoption of Rule I 0b-6 as a 
complement to the stabilization rule in 1955, all this is still true."60 
The Commission has stated the proposition forcefully: "[O]ver-
the-counter manipulation of unregistered securities will continue 
to be-as it always has been-a violation of the common law, of 
Section I 7(a) of the Securities Act, and of Section 15(c)(l) of the 
Securities Exchange Act and Rule [15cl-2] thereunder."61 Every 
retailing dealer must, therefore, be continuously aware of the stan-
dards by which he must test his acts and representations, whether 
or not he is engaged in a "distribution," however defined: Is his 
sales "pitch" fair, honest, and well founded? Are his activities in 
"the market"-the indispensable backdrop for his retailing effort 
--of a character consistent with the requirement that that market, 
too, be "fair and honest"?62 Both the responsibility for and the 
experience requisite to arrive at compliance with these standards 
are, first if not last, in the hands of the professional participant in 
the securities markets. 
2. Current Cases and Practices 
The Commission has characterized the word "distribution," as 
it appears in Rule l0b-6, in terms of "a major selling effort" on 
behalf of a broker or dealer,63 and has identified as two basic fac-
tors to be considered in distinguishing a distribution from ordi-
nary trading transactions "the magnitude of the offering" and "par-
ticularly . . . the selling efforts and selling methods utilized."64 
Nevertheless, with respect to the first factor, a federal district court 
has recently held that a distribution was involved where only 6,692 
shares out of 150,000 outstanding shares (at least 93,308 of which 
were free floating shares on an intrastate Blue Sky basis) were in-
volved in the offering. 65 
159 See note 24 supra. 
60 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1596 (2d ed. 1961). See also note 24 supra. 
61 Barrett &: Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 331 (1941). 
62 Exchange Act § 2. 
63 Gob Shops of Am., 39 S.E.C. 92 (1959). 
64 Bruns, Nordeman &: Co., 40 S.E.C. 652 (1961). See also note 67 infra for an appli-
cation of this double standard. 
65 SEC v. Elect-ronics Security Corp., 217 F., Supp. 831 (D. Minn. 1963). The case 
involved a publicly owned broker-dealer which engaged in purchasing for its own ac-
count 5,185 shares of its own stock at $2.00 to $2.50 per share while selling 6,692 shares, 
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The Commission recently held that a disposition of 860,000 
shares, of a total of 10,000,000 "penny" shares outstanding, con-
stituted a distribution for Rule IOb-6 purposes.66 Although the 
number of shares involved was not insignificant, the Commission 
was at least equally concerned with the selling methods employed 
by the firm, and the publishing of daily bids in the National Daily 
Quotation Sheets during the distribution of the shares in 328 
separate retail transactions.67 
The Special Study, in its treatment of this subject, also tended 
to emphasize the nature of the selling campaign that accompanied 
a disposition of a block of securities or an inventory workout pro-
gram rather than relying on the actual number of shares being 
distributed. In one case cited by the Study, an integrated firm, i.e., 
one having both retail and trading facilities, managed an under-
writing of an offering which had all the earmarks of a "hot issue."68 
Immediately after the completion of the distribution, but prior to 
the termination of trading restrictions, the price jumped ten 
points. There was, however, little actual trading being done in the 
immediate after-market, most transactions arising from agency 
execution of customers' buy and sell orders. Subsequently, as the 
buying pressure fell off, the price began to fall and the underwriter 
began to make a market in the stock. Eventually, the underwriter 
became the only market-maker in the stock, retail buying pressure 
fell to a low ebb, and the underwriter was the "bucket" for all 
shares coming into the market. He thus acquired a long position 
of 13,000 shares representing an investment of over $300,000 (the 
which it had acquired at $1.15 per share from the wife of a controlling stockholder, in 
67 transactions at $2.00 to $3.00 per share. 
66 C. A. Benson &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7044, March 26, 1963. 
67 Although the National Daily Quotation Sheets are circulated almost solely among 
brokers and dealers, they serve to provide a supporting basis for retail prices. The Special 
Study states, "The insertion of quotations may also be used to qualify a security for 
retail quotation on one of the NASD lists and to provide a basis for a fictitious retail 
price to be used in a selling campaign." Special Study pt. 2, at 608-09. See also SEC 
v. Scott Taylor, 183 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Landau Co., 40 S.E.C. 1119, 1123-27 
(1962); Gob Shops of Am., 39 S.E.C. 92, 101-02 (1959); Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 
106, 126-28 (1949). 
Although an application of both factors may be implicit in every case, one or the 
other may be emphasized in a Commission opinion. For a clear-cut application of the 
"dual test," see Sutro Bros., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7053 at 8, April 10, 
1963, where the Commission stated, "Having found that registrant was an underwriter 
participating in a distribution of AGR stock, it follows that the placing of bids for the 
stock in the pink sheets was a violation of Rule 17 CFR 240.I0b-6 under Section lO(b) 
of the Exchange Act. [Footnote omitted.] It is clear that the offers and sales of the 
AGR stock were made for or on behalf of the issuer or persons in control of the issuer 
and the sales were the result not of unsolicited orders, but of an aggressive selling cam-
paign of a substantial number of shares." 
68 Special Study pt. 2, at 583-85. 
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original offering involved a distribution of 436,086 shares). The 
firm then began a selling program and, as stated in the Report: 
"Representatives of [the firm] testified that at this point, when 
the security was selling at or about the offering price, they 
were concerned about their long position and salesmen were 
told that they would be paid a larger than normal profit for 
sale of [the stock] to retail customers. [Footnote omitted.]"69 
The firm continued to buy shares coming into the market during 
this sales campaign. The selling effort produced a 10,000 share 
short position which was covered after the special selling effort had 
ended.70 
The nature of the problem in the context of the OTC market 
is illuminated by a comparison with the facts presented by an 
"exchange distribution" described in the Report as follows: 
"In an exchange distribution member firms solicit or-
ders with respect to the block and the offsetting buy orders 
are then 'crossed' on the floor of the Exchange with the block 
sale order. The selling price is within the prevailing bid and 
offer for the security in the regq.lar auction market. The pur-
chaser usually pays a net price and the seller pays at least the 
equivalent of a double commission. No public announcement 
is made of the distribution until it is completed, at which 
time the transaction appears on the tape preceded by the term 
'Dist.' Salesmen receive a higher rate of compensation in mak-
ing sales of the security involved in an exchange distribution 
than would be paid with respect to normal trading transac-
tions. [Footnote omitted.] 
"An exchange distribution often takes place through a 
syndicate with a manager. This is not an invariable practice 
and large blocks have been distributed entirely through one 
member firm. Thus, in 1961, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, 
& Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch) disposed of a block of 167,174 
shares of General Electric Co. for an aggregate selling price 
of $12,078,359 through an exchange distribution utilizing 
only its own organization. A firm like Merrill Lynch, with its 
many branch offices, has sufficient distribution facilities that 
the assistance of a selling group may not be required. [Foot-
note omitted.]"71 
69 Id. at 584. 
70 This discussion, and that which follows, is not intended to treat or comment on 
the activities of the underwriter, and the applicability of rules other than Rule lOb-6 
under the Exchange Act, in connection with the assumption of the short position and 
the methods by which such short position was eliminated. 
71 spedal Study pt. I, at 562. 
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It is interesting to note the features common to the OTC and 
exchange distributions just described. Both involved (I) a sub-
stantial block (in the light of the market for the particular secu-
rity), (2) an organized selling effort by a single firm, and (3) extra 
compensation for the sales force. Both also would fall within the 
definition of "distribution" provided elsewhere in the Report.72 
The feature conspicuously not common to the two offerings is the 
nature of the markets "away" from the offerings. The auction mar-
ket, buttressed by specialist participation, provided by the New 
York Stock Exchange for General Electric (which-and this is a 
significant addition-is one of those stocks which in some measure 
"sells itself"), contrasts sharply with that provided for the OTC 
issue. In the latter case the managing underwriter, not surpris-
ingly, had become the principal market-maker, if not the only one. 
The only counterpart for the auction market-specialist combina-
tion to be found was located at his trading desk. Furthermore, 
absent his continuing merchandising effort at retail, the trading 
market could be expected to shrivel in depth and breadth.73 The 
relevance is this: the independence of the market serving as the 
backdrop (more accurately, the backstop) for the General Electric 
exchange distribution meant that Rule I0b-6, were it applicable,74 
could have been meticulously observed.75 The lack of indepen-
dence of the trading market provided by the principal underwriter-
market-maker is one of the primary targets of the prohibitions of 
the rule. It is not difficult to conclude that the rule, in its present 
form, applies literally with all its rigor to the OTC example. It 
is more difficult to conclude, in the light of the need for-and 
the needs of-the OTC market, that this result is altogether in 
the public interest. The Special Study offers no resolution of the 
72 See note 57 supra. 
73 See note 40 supra. 
u Rule l0b-6 contains an exemption (Exemption 10) for "[exchange] transactions 
effected • • • in accordance with the provisions of a plan filed by such exchange under 
Rule 10b-2(d) and declared effective by the -Commission." Rule lOb-2 generally prohibits 
the payment of compensation for the solicitation of purchases in the effectuation of a 
distribution on an exchange but contains an exemption for transactions pursuant to 
a plan filed by a national securities exchange and declared effective by the Commission. 
Since 1942, several exchanges, including the New York and American Stock Exchanges, 
have filed such plans for distributions (such as the "special offering•• and "exchange 
distribution" plans) and such filings have been declared effective by the Commission. 
Each such plan, however, contains a prohibition against bids and purchases (except 
lawful stabilizing purchases under .the special offering plan) by the parties to the 
arrangement. 
711 The analysis, as it applies to the General Electric example, would also apply to 
any distribution of a highly liquid security whether or not the prohibitions of Rule IOb-6 
apply. It is in the situation where there is not a broad and deep market in a particular 
security that a distinction is made and the ensuing problems arise. 
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dilemma and, at this writing, the Commission has not developed 
one, other than in the area of stabilization.76 
The provisions of Rule I 0b-6 are equally applicable, although 
perhaps less obviously, to the wholesale dealer who effects a distri-
bution in the OTC market. The Special Study indicates that block 
sales or inventory workouts of unlisted securities77 by a wholesale 
dealer, unless syndicated pursuant to a formal underwriting agree-
ment, as stated previously, are regarded by many firms as not fall-
ing within the definition of a distribution.78 Instances are cited 
wherein block sales were made either on an informal syndicated 
basis or by gradual workout while the wholesaler continued to 
quote bids and offers and to make purchases, especially when the 
market appeared to weaken.79 
It is apparent that, with respect to unregistered distributions, 
the determination as to when a distribution is being made, for 
purposes of Rule l0b-6, is, in the first instance, to be made by 
the broker-dealer himself. Since the Commission's rules require 
disclosure to the Commission of an unregistered offering ( other 
than offerings pursuant to the exemption provided by Regula-
tion A) only where stabilizing purchases are to be effected and 
where the aggregate offering price exceeds $300,000,80 it is often 
very difficult for anyone other than such broker-dealer to be 
apprised of the fact of the distribution. He must, therefore, be 
alert to the possibilities of the rule's application. This deter-
mination may be most difficult in the situation where trading 
activities result in a long position materially larger than normal. 
However, in most other cases, he is usually aware of the fact that 
the disposition is out of the regular course of events. In such 
76 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.lOb-7, .lOb-8 (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
77 Block sales and other distributions of securities on the exchange are closely regu-
lated by the provisions of the "exchange distribution" plan or "special offering" plan, 
whichever controls. See note 74 supra. Such distributions of listed securities made 
off the exchange but which involve the participation of stock exchange member firms 
are not subject to any regulation by the exchange although the permission of the ex-
change must be secured by such participating member firms. See New York Stock Ex-
change Rules 393-395. Rule lOb-6, however, still applies. Note also that exception (11) 
applies only to OTC transactions. The activities of the specialists likewise are regulated 
by the exchange and the prohibition of Rule lOb-6. See generally Special Study pt. 1, 
at 560-63; id. pt. 2, at 292. 
78 See text accompanying notes 39, 53 supra. With respect to block sales by institu-
tional investors through the primary market-makers and the possible disregard of Rule 
lOb-6, see Special Study pt. 1, at 568 n.216. See generally id. pt. 2, ch. VIII-C. 
79 Id. pt. 2, at 591-92. 
80 Exchange Act Rule 17a-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1963). See also 
Exchange Act Rules 15cl-4, 15cl-6, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15cl-4, .15cl-6 (1949) for other related 
requirements. 
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situations where extra comm1ss1ons or other incentives are em-
ployed, or a dealer selling group is formed while trading activ-
ities continue, the broker-dealer would appear to have taken 
himself out of the realm of normal trading activities. As a 
matter of prudence, he can resolve his doubts by assuming that 
the rule applies. He can then observe the provisions of exception 
(11) by discontinuing bids and purchases, in addition to his discon-
tinuance of solicitations, for the requisite ten-day period before 
proceeding with his selling effort. The "unexpected" block distri-
bution situation must be distinguished. Since the dealer cannot 
anticipate the occasion for the special selling effort, he is clearly 
not a participant in a distribution until the business is presented to 
him. By reason of the circumstances, the block seller may proceed 
at once to his selling effort without any requirement that he ob-
serve the ten-day "cooling-off" period. 
APPENDIX 
Rule I0b-6 
Prohibitions Against Trading by Persons Interested in a Distribution. 
(a) It shall constitute a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" as used 
in section IO(b) of the act for any person, 
(1) Who is an underwriter or prospective underwriter in a particular distribution of 
securities, or 
(2) Who is the issuer or other person on whose behalf such a distribution is being 
made, or 
(3) Who is a broker, dealer, or other person who has agreed to participate or is 
participating in such a distribution, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or 
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, either alone or with one or 
more other persons, to bid for or purchase for any account in which he has a beneficial inter-
est, any security which is the subject of such distribution, or any security of the same class and 
series, or any right to purchase any such security, or to attempt to induce any person to pur-
chase any such security or right, until after he has completed his participation in such dis-
tribution: Provided, however, That this rule shall not prohibit (I) transactions in connection 
with the distribution effected otherwise than on a securities exchange with the issuer or 
other person or persons on whose behalf such distribution is being made or among under-
writers, prospective underwriters or other persons who have agreed to participate or 
are participating in such distribution; (2) unsolicited privately negotiated purchases, each 
involving a substantial amount of such security, effected neither on a securities exchange 
nor from or through a broker or dealer; or (3) purchases by an issuer effected more 
than forty days after the commencement of the distribution for the purpose of satis-
fying a sinking fund or similar obligation to which it is subject; or (4) odd-lot trans-
actions (and the off-setting round-lot transactions hereinafter referred to) by a person 
registered as an odd-lot dealer in such security on a national securities exchange who 
offsets such odd-lot transactions in such security by round-lot transactions as promptly 
as possible; or (5) brokerage transactions not involving solicitation of the customer's 
order; or (6) offers to sell or the solicitation of offers to buy the securities being dis-
tributed (including securities or rights acquired in stabilizing) or securities or rights 
offered as principal by the person making such offer to sell or solicitation; or (7) the 
exercise of any right or conversion privilege to acquire any security; or (8) stabilizing 
transactions not in violation of Rule lOb-7; or (9) bids for or purchases of rights not in 
violation of Rule lOb-8; or (10) transactions effected on a national securities exchange 
in accordance with the provisions of a plan filed by such exchange under Rule IOb-2 (d) 
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and declared effective by the Commission; or (11) purchases or bids by an underwriter, pro-
spective underwriter or dealer otherwise than on a securities exchange, 10 or more business 
days prior to the proposed commencement of such distribution (or 5 or more business 
days in the case of unsolicited purchases), if none of such purchases or bids are for the 
purpose of creating actual, or apparent, active trading in or raising the price of such 
security. In the case of securities offered pursuant to an effective registration statement 
under the Securities Act of 1933 the distribution shall not be deemed to commence for 
purposes of this clause (11) prior to the effective date of the registration statement. 
(b) The distribution of a security (1) which is immediately exchangeable for or 
convertible into another security, or (2) which entitles the holder thereof immediately 
to acquire another security, shall be deemed to include a distribution of such other 
security within the meaning of this rule. 
(c) The following shall be applicable for the purposes of this rule: 
(1) The term "underwriter" means a person who has agreed with an issuer or other 
person on whose behalf a distribution is to be made (A) to purchase securities for dis-
tribution or (B) to distribute securities for or on behalf of such issuer or other person 
or (C) to manage or supervise a distribution of securities for or on behalf of such issuer 
or other person. 
(2) The term "prospective underwriter" means a person (A) who has agreed to submit 
or has submitted a bid to become an underwriter of securities as to which the issuer, 
or other person on whose behalf the distribution is to be made, has issued a public 
invitation for bids, or (B) who has reached an understanding, with the issuer or other 
person on whose behalf a distribution is to be made, that he will become an under• 
writer, whether or not the terms and conditions of the underwriting have been agreed 
upon. 
(3) A person shall be deemed to have completed his participation in a particular 
distribution as follows: (A) The issuer or other person on whose behalf such distribu-
tion is being made, when such distribution is completed; (B) an underwriter, when 
he has distributed his participation, including all other securities of the same class ac• 
quired in connection with the distribution, and any stabilization arrangements and 
trading restrictions with respect to such distribution to which he is a party have been 
terminated; (C) any other person, when he has distributed his participation. A person, 
including an underwriter or dealer, shall be deemed for purposes of this paragraph 
(c) (3) to have distributed securities acquired by him for investment. 
(d) The provisions of this rule shall not apply to any of the following securities: 
(I) "Exempted securities" as defined in section 3(a)(l2) of the act, including securities 
issued, or guaranteed both as to principal and interest, by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development; or (2) face-amount certificates issued by a face-amount 
certificate company, or redeemable securities issued by an open-end management com-
pany or a unit investment trust. Any terms used in clause (2) of this paragraph (d) 
which are defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940 shall have the meanings 
specified in such act. 
(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any distribution of securities 
by an issuer to its employees, or to employees of its subsidiaries, or to a trustee or other 
person acquiring such securities for the account of such employees, pursuant to (I) a 
stock option plan involving only "restricted stock options" as defined in section 421 of 
the Internal Revenue Code; or (2) a savings, investment or stock purchase plan provid-
ing for both (A) periodic payments (or payroll deductions) for acquisition of securities 
by participating employees and (B) periodic purchases of the securities by participating 
employees, or the person acquiring them for the account of such employees. 
(f) This rule shall not prohibit any transaction or transactions if the Commission, 
upon written request or upon its own motion, exempts such transaction or transactions, 
either unconditionally or on specified terms and conditions, as not constituting a manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance comprehended within the purpose of this rule. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-6 (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
